A Theory of Epistemic Justification Based on Cause and Reason

Since Gettier published his famous “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, epistemologists (including Gettier) have referred to “Epistemic Justification1” as “having good reason to believe” and a series of discussions around Justification, but in this article, I will argue that the previous understanding of Justification is inadequate and that “Justification” as a necessary condition for knowledge should itself contain at least two connotations, “Reasons” and “Causes”. I will show that my point of view can be supported by at least two reasons. First, “having good reason to believe” as a normative understanding of justification is not sufficient for the definition of knowledge, and it is weaker compared to reliabilism of justification, which argues justification is not even a necessary condition for knowledge. Second, if we accept that “Justification” should be interpreted as “having good cause to believe”, we will be unable to escape a kind of skepticism named Agrrippa’s Skepticism (AS), which accuses all Justifications are impossible, is a type of skepticism about Justification. In this article, I will show that 1) “Justification” is a necessary condition for knowledge, so, “Justification” must mean more than merely “having sufficient cause to believe”. 2) What AS presupposed is this traditional theory of Justification, and if we wish to prevent AS, we cannot simply interpret “justification” as “have a good reason to believe”. 3) Explain whether a new understanding of Justification, compatible with Cause and Reason, is possible.